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Abstract. With the emergence of the multi-party quantum key agree-
ment, the participant attack has attracted great attention, since it is
a destructive attack which is easier to obtain the effective information
than the external attack. In this paper, a new multi-party quantum key
agreement protocol with six-qubit cluster states which has the verifica-
tion function is put forward. At first, a verifiable distributor is intro-
duced to distribute the remaining information of six-qubit cluster states
to any two adjacent participants after preserving a part. Next, once the
participants verify the correctness of the received information with the
properties of six-qubit cluster states under the X-basis, the cluster states
are used as the quantum resource to perform the X operation in the par-
ticipant operation phase. Finally, it can not only verify the correctness of
the recovered shared key, but also guarantee its simultaneity through the
trusted design combiner and homomorphic hash function. Furthermore,
the security analysis shows that the new protocol can resist the external
and internal attacks. And it’s proved that our protocol is meaningful
through the comparation analysis.
Keywords: Quantum key agreement · Verifiability · Multi-party · Six-
qubit cluster states.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography is an interdiscipline that combines classical cryptog-
raphy with quantum mechanics. Different from some cryptosystems based on
mathematical complexity, its theoretical basis is quantum mechanics, namely
uncertainty principle and non-cloning principle. Therefore, it has overwhelm-
ing advantages in the information security, and its development is extremely
rapid. Nowadays, the research of quantum cryptography is extremely active in
the fields of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2,3,4], quantum secret sharing
(QSS)[5,6,7] and quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [8,9]. Unlike
the QKD protocols, quantum key agreement (QKA) [10,11,12,13,14] is a new
important branch that each participant plays an equivalent role on generating
the shared key.
In 2004, Zhou et al. [15] proposed a groundbreaking QKA scheme by us-
ing quantum teleportation technique, in which two participants can generate a
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shared key over public channels. However, Tsai et al. [16] found that it cannot re-
sist the participant attacks. A QKA scheme based on maximally entangled states
was put forward by Hsueh and Chen[17] as well, but it was discovered that a
participant can recover the shared key. In 2010, a two-party QKA scheme which
uses the delayed measurement method and the standard BB84 protocol [18] was
proposed by Chong and Hwang [19]. And Shen et al. [20] presented a two-party
QKA scheme based on four-qubit cluster states in 2014. Unfortunately, it only
applied to two-party, and it’s obvious that multi-party quantum key agreement
(MPQKA) schemes are more applicable to the actual situation. Thus, Shi and
Zhong [21] extended from two-party QKA protocols to multi-party successfully,
and proposed the first MPQKA scheme. Subsequently, many MPQKA schemes
[22,23,24,25] were proposed.
Security is crucial in the quantum cryptography, so the participant attacks
[26,27] should be paid more attention in the multi-party environment. In 2019,
Liu et al. [28] proposed a high efficient MPQKA protocol based on four-qubit
cluster states. However, we find out that it could not resist the participant at-
tacks. Because all participants can’t know the value of the shared key and can’t
recover the shared key at the same time, the internal fraudster interferes with
the other participants after recovering the shared key which will lead to an error
shared key but cannot be found.
In this paper, we propose a new MPQKA protocol based on the six-qubit
cluster states. It can not only realize the recovery of the shared key by all par-
ticipants, but also guarantee the correctness and simultaneity of the recovered
shared key. The advantages of the protocol are as follows:
1) A distributor whose each operation can be verified is introduced. The dis-
tributor distributes the remaining subsequences after preserving two sub-
sequences. Therefore, the shared key will not be recovered in advance by
the internal fraudsters or external eavesdroppers during the transmission
process.
2) In the process of transmitting the information by the subsequences, the decoy
particles are always inserted randomly to resist the eavesdropping attacks.
3) Before recovering the shared key, the trusted design combiner (TDC) [6] will
use the homomorphic hash function [29] to detect the received information,
which can not only ensure the privacy of the shared key before all participants
complete the operation, but also ensure the correctness and simultaneous of
the recovered shared key.
4) The shared key is recovered by all participants, and the participant attacks
can be resisted successfully.
The structure of this paper is as follows. This basic knowledge is introduced
in Section 2, including the related comments of six-qubit cluster states and the
homomorphic hash function. A verifiable MPQKA protocol with six-qubit cluster
states is put forward in Section 3. The security of this protocol is discussed in
Section 4, which includes the external and internal attacks. In Section 5, our
protocol is compared with three MPQKA protocols. In Section 6, namely the
last part, this paper is summarized.
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2 Basic Knowledge
Next, the basic knowledge used in the protocol design is introduced, including the
related contents of six-qubit cluster states and the homomorphic hash function.
2.1 Related Contents of Six-qubit Cluster States
2.1.1 the X Operation and Six-qubit Cluster States[28]
Now, we will introduce the X operation used in our protocol: X = |0〉〈1| +
|1〉〈0|. This operation can realize the flip of the particles, i.e., |0〉 → |1〉, |1〉 → |0〉.
Then we use six-qubit cluster states as quantum resource, that is,
|C〉 = 1
2
(|000000〉+ |000111〉+ |111000〉 − |111111〉)123456 . (1)
Assuming that Bob and David generate their secret keys randomly:
KB = (K
(1)
B ,K
(2)
B , · · · ,K(m)B ),KD = (K(1)D ,K(2)D , · · · ,K(m)D ).
where K
(j)
B ,K
(j)
D ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, j = 1, 2, · · · ,m. Bob performs the X opera-
tion on the particles 3 and 4 of |C〉 according to KB . That is, if the first bit of
KB is 0 (1), the particle 3 is stationary (flipped). If the second bit of KB is 0
(1), the particle 4 is stationary (flipped). And David performs the X operation
on the particles 5 and 6 of |C〉 according to KD. If the first bit of KD is 0 (1),
the particle 5 is stationary (flipped). If the second bit of KD is 0 (1), the particle
6 is stationary (flipped). Therefore, we will obtain one of the following 16 cluster
states:
|C1〉 = 1
2
(|000000〉+ |000111〉+ |111000〉 − |111111〉)123456,
|C2〉 = 1
2
(|000001〉+ |000110〉+ |111001〉 − |111110〉)123456,
|C3〉 = 1
2
(|000010〉+ |000101〉+ |111010〉 − |111101〉)123456,
|C4〉 = 1
2
(|000011〉+ |000100〉+ |111011〉 − |111100〉)123456,
|C5〉 = 1
2
(|000100〉+ |000011〉+ |111100〉 − |111011〉)123456,
|C6〉 = 1
2
(|000101〉+ |000010〉+ |111101〉 − |111010〉)123456,
|C7〉 = 1
2
(|000110〉+ |000001〉+ |111110〉 − |111001〉)123456,
|C8〉 = 1
2
(|000111〉+ |000000〉+ |111111〉 − |111000〉)123456,
|C9〉 = 1
2
(|001000〉+ |001111〉+ |110000〉 − |110111〉)123456,
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|C10〉 = 1
2
(|001001〉+ |001110〉+ |110001〉 − |110110〉)123456,
|C11〉 = 1
2
(|001010〉+ |001101〉+ |110010〉 − |110101〉)123456,
|C12〉 = 1
2
(|001011〉+ |001100〉+ |110011〉 − |110100〉)123456,
|C13〉 = 1
2
(|001100〉+ |001011〉+ |110100〉 − |110011〉)123456,
|C14〉 = 1
2
(|001101〉+ |001010〉+ |110101〉 − |110010〉)123456,
|C15〉 = 1
2
(|001110〉+ |001001〉+ |110110〉 − |110001〉)123456,
|C16〉 = 1
2
(|001111〉+ |001000〉+ |110111〉 − |110000〉)123456.
We can find the corresponding relationship between the secret key and the
transformed cluster states in the Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. The relationship between the secret key and the transformed cluster states
2.1.2 the Properties of Six-qubit Cluster States under the X-basis
The six-qubit cluster state |C〉 (see the equation 1) under the X-basis can be
expressed as:
|C〉 = 1
4
(|+ + + + + +〉+ |+ + +−−+〉+ |+ + + +−−〉+ |+ + +−+−〉)
+
1
4
(| − −+ + + +〉+ | − −+−−+〉+ | − −+ +−−〉+ | − −+−+−〉)
+
1
4
(|+−−+ + +〉+ |+−−−−+〉+ |+−−+−−〉+ |+−−−+−〉)
+
1
4
(| −+−+ + +〉+ | −+−−−+〉+ | −+−+−−〉+ | −+−−+−〉) .
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First of all, some specific stipulations are made. When the particles 1 and 2
of |C〉 are |+ +〉 or | − −〉, namely the result of particles 1 and 2 are the same
when they are measured with the X-basis, the measurement result is recorded
as 0. When the particles 1 and 2 of |C〉 are | + −〉 or | − +〉, namely the result
of particles 1 and 2 are different when they are measured with the X-basis, the
measurement result is recorded as 1. Similarly, when the particles 3 and 4 (or
the particles 5 and 6) are the same by measuring with the X-basis, it is recorded
as 0. Otherwise, it is recorded as 1.
It can be seen from the above formula that the six-qubit cluster states |C〉
have the following properties:
1) When the measurement result of particles 1 and 2 is 0, the results of particles
3, 4 and 5, 6 are either 0 simultaneously or 1 simultaneously.
2) When the measurement result of particles 1 and 2 is 1, the results of particles
3, 4 and 5, 6 are inevitable to exist that one is 0 and the other is 1.
2.2 Homomorphic Hash[29]
The hash function H of the additive homomorphism has the following charac-
teristics: all x and y satisfy the equation: H(x)H(y) = H(x+ y).
It should be noted that here the group operation in the output domain is
arbitrary, but usually a product.
For instance, the hash function H: Zp → Zl can be constructed around the
discrete-log assumption by a generator g as H(v) = gv mod l, which generates
a collision-resistant hash as discussed in the literature[30].
It is easy to verify the homomorphism by calculation:
H(v1)H(v2) = g
v1gv2 = gv1+v2 = H(v1 + v2)(all mod l).
It is discussed in the literature [31] about selecting a suitable generator.
3 Protocol Description
Based on six-qubit cluster states, we put forward a verifiable MPQKA in this
section. It includes the distributor Alice and n participants P1,P2, · · · ,Pn, where
n is an even number.
Each participant Pi(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) randomly generates a 2m-bit string
Ki = (K
(1)
i ,K
(2)
i , · · · ,K(m)i ),
as his secret key. And he calculates the corresponding hash function value H(Ki)
with identity by Ki, where H is the homomorphic hash function. Then he will
send H(Ki) to the TDC.
6 Li-Juan Liu et al.
3.1 Distributor Operation
3.1.1 Alice prepares m+ l six-qubit cluster states |C〉. Then she picks up the k-
th qubit from each six-qubit cluster state to compose the subsequence Sk, where
k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Alice keeps S1 and S2 for herself, then randomly selects enough
decoy particles from four quantum states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}, and randomly in-
serts them to obtain subsequences S∗k(k = 3, 4, 5, 6). At last, Alice sends S
∗
3 , S
∗
4
to Pi, and sends S
∗
5 , S
∗
6 to Pi+1, where i+ 1 = (i+ 1) mod n, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
3.1.2 After confirming that Pi (Pi+1) has received S
∗
3 and S
∗
4 (S
∗
5 and S
∗
6 ), Alice
announces the positions of the decoy particles as well as the corresponding mea-
surement bases. Then Pi (Pi+1) uses the given measurement bases to measure
the decoy particles and informs Alice about the measurement results. Finally,
Alice calculates the error rate according to the initial states of the decoy particles
and the measurement results. If the error rate is less than predetermined value,
Pi (Pi+1) will recover S3 and S4 (S5 and S6), and proceed to the next step.
Otherwise, she will abandon this protocol and prepare the new subsequences.
3.2 Authentication of Distributor Identity
Pi and Pi+1 randomly specify the positions of l particles from {1, 2, · · · ,m +
l}. They require Alice to measure the corresponding positions of S1 and S2
with the X-basis and announce the measurement results. When they receive the
measurement results, Pi and Pi+1 will measure the particles of the corresponding
positions of S3, S4 and S5, S6 with the X-basis. When Alice announces the
result is 0, the results of Pi and Pi+1 are either 0 or 1 simultaneously. When she
announces the result is 1, the results of Pi and Pi+1 must satisfy that one is 0
and the other is 1. Then it can be confirmed that Alice prepares |C〉 correctly.
If Alice’s identity is correct, Pi and Pi+1 will eliminate l particles of the
corresponding positions from Sk, and they will form new subsequences S
′
k, where
k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Then the next step is proceeded to.
3.3 Participants Operation
3.3.1 According to K
(j)
i (K
(j)
i+1), Pi (Pi+1) performs the X operation on the j-th
of S
′
3 and the j-th of S
′
4 (the j-th of S
′
5 and the j-th of S
′
6), where j = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
Then he can get S
(i)
3 and S
(i)
4 (S
(i+1)
5 and S
(i+1)
6 ). This rule is described as
follows. If the first bit of K
(j)
i is 0 (1), the j-th position of S
′
3 is stationary
(flipped). If the second bit of K
(j)
i is 0 (1), the j-th position of S
′
4 is stationary
(flipped). If the first bit of K
(j)
i+1 is 0 (1), the j-th position of S
′
5 is stationary
(flipped). If the second bit of K
(j)
i+1 is 0 (1), the j-th position of S
′
6 is stationary
(flipped).
3.3.2 Pi (Pi+1) randomly selects enough decoy particles and inserts them into
S
(i)
3 and S
(i)
4 (S
(i+1)
5 and S
(i+1)
6 ), and obtains S
(i)∗
3 and S
(i)∗
4 (S
(i+1)∗
5 and
S
(i+1)∗
6 ). Then Pi (Pi+1) will send S
(i)∗
3 and S
(i)∗
4 (S
(i+1)∗
5 and S
(i+1)∗
6 ) to Pi−1
(Pi+2).
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3.3.3 As Pi and Pi+1 did in the step 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, the participants Pi−1,Pi+2,
· · · ,Pi−n−42 and Pi+n−22 perform the eavesdropping detections and the X opera-
tion. This process will be terminated until Pi−n−22 (Pi+
n
2
) obtains S
(i−n−22 )∗
3 and
S
(i−n−22 )∗
4 (S
(i+n2 )∗
5 and S
(i+n2 )∗
6 ) and sends them to Alice.
3.4 Measurement
By the same method as the step 3.1.2, Alice can recover S
(i−n−22 )
3 , S
(i−n−22 )
4 ,
S
(i+n2 )
5 and S
(i+n2 )
6 without exceeding predetermined value of the error rate.
Then Alice combines the j-th particle of S
′
1, S
′
2, S
(i−n−22 )
3 , S
(i−n−22 )
4 , S
(i+n2 )
5
and S
(i+n2 )
6 , and measures them with the cluster basis respectively, where j =
1, 2, · · · ,m. Thus, Alice can get KB and KD, then calculate the corresponding
hash function values H(B) and H(D).
3.5 TDC Operation
Alice sends KB and KD, H(B) and H(D) to the TDC.
3.5.1 The following verifications will be performed in the TDC:
H(B) = H(Ki−n−22 )H(Ki−n−42 ) · · ·H(Ki). (2)
H(D) = H(Ki+1)H(Ki+2) · · ·H(Ki+n2 ). (3)
H(B) = H(KB). (4)
H(D) = H(KD). (5)
3.5.2 If the above verifications are correct, the TDC will recover the shared key:
s = KB ⊕KD.
So all participants collaborate together to recover the shared key s.
4 Security Analysis
The security of this protocol is proved in this section. Next, it will be analyzed
through the external and internal attacks.
4.1 External attack
4.1.1 Intercept-and-resend Attack
The first attack strategy adopted by the eavesdropper Eve is the intercept-
and-resend attack. It mainly analyzes the following two situations:
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1) Eve intercepts the subsequences S3 and S4 (S5 and S6) sent by Alice, and
resends the forged subsequences of herself to Pi (Pi+1).
2) Eve intercepts the subsequences when the participant transmits the infor-
mation, and resends her own forged subsequences.
For the above two cases, the decoy particles {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} are randomly
selected and inserted into the subsequences, and the sender will not announce
the positions of the decoy particles and the corresponding measurement bases
until the receiver receives the subsequences.
And if Eve wants to achieve the intercept-and-resend attack, she needs to
know the information of the decoy particles before the eavesdropping detections,
otherwise she will be found. Thus, this attack is carried out by Eve without
knowing any information about the decoy particles, then the probability that
Alice and the participants find this attack is 1− ( 34 )m [32] (m is the number of
the decoy particles). When m is large enough, the probability of eavesdropping
being discovered approaches to 1.
Therefore, it can be proved that the intercept-and-resend attack is invalid
for this protocol.
4.1.2 Entangle-and-measure Attack
The second attack strategy adopted by the eavesdropper Eve is the entangle-
and-measure attack. Assuming that Eve prepares an auxiliary quantum state
|E〉, she entangles the auxiliary particle on the transmitted particle by perform-
ing the unitary operation UE , and steals the secret information by measuring
the auxiliary particle.
The unitary operation UE is defined as follows:
UE |0〉|E〉 = a|0〉|E00〉+ b|1〉|E01〉.
UE |1〉|E〉 = c|0〉|E10〉+ d|1〉|E11〉.
where |a|2 + |b|2 = 1, |c|2 + |d|2 = 1. Since decoy particles are contained in the
protocol, the unitary operation UE must satisfy the following conditions:
UE (|0〉|E〉) = a|0〉|E00〉.
UE (|1〉|E〉) = d|1〉|E11〉.
UE (|+〉|E〉) = 1
2
|+〉 (a|E00〉+ b|E01〉+ c|E10〉+ d|E11〉)
+
1
2
|−〉 (a|E00〉 − b|E01〉+ c|E10〉 − d|E11〉) .
UE (|−〉|E〉) = 1
2
|+〉 (a|E00〉+ b|E01〉 − c|E10〉 − d|E11〉)
+
1
2
|−〉 (a|E00〉 − b|E01〉 − c|E10〉+ d|E11〉) .
In order to avoid the increase of the error rate, the unitary operation UE
must meet the following conditions when Eve introduces the auxiliary particle:
a|E00〉+ c|E10〉 = b|E01〉+ d|E11〉.
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a|E00〉 − c|E10〉 = −b|E01〉+ d|E11〉.
It is easy to get a = d = 1, b = c = 0 and |E00〉 = |E11〉. So we have the
following equations:
UE (|0〉|E〉) = |0〉|E00〉.
UE (|1〉|E〉) = |1〉|E11〉.
Therefore, no matter what the useful state is, Eve can only get the same infor-
mation from auxiliary particles. Thus, the entangle-and-measure attack cannot
succeed in the protocol.
4.1.3 Trojan Horse Attack
The third attack strategy adopted by the eavesdropper Eve is Trojan horse
attack. The photons used in the protocol may be insecure to against the two types
of Trojan horse attack, that is, the delay-photon attack [33] and the invisible
photon attack [34,35].
At first, in order to prevent the delay-photon attack, the participants can
extract a part of the photons and split each particle by the photon number
splitter (PNS). Then they use the corresponding measurement bases to measure
the photons. If the multi-photon rate is much higher than expected, the PNS
will find this attack.
Next, a wavelength optical device that filters out the invisible photons can be
installed by the participants to prevent the invisible photon attack. The optical
device allows the operational photons to enter, while the invisible photons that
belong to Eve will be eliminated.
Therefore, this protocol can completely resist Trojan horse attack.
4.2 Internal Attack
4.2.1 the Distributor Attack
In this protocol, the distributor Alice needs to perform two key operations:
1) Alice needs to prepare six-qubit cluster states |C〉 correctly.
2) When all participants complete eavesdropping detections and the X opera-
tions, Alice need use the cluster states to correctly measure the subsequences
the she obtains, and calculates the hash function values corresponding to the
measurement results.
For the first operation, Alice needs to prepare six-qubit cluster states and
send the subsequence S3, S4 (S5, S6) to Pi (Pi+1). The attack strategy that
the dishonest distributor may adopt is to prepare the wrong |C〉 to destroy the
protocol. Nevertheless, Pi and Pi+1 need to verify the cluster states prepared by
Alice in the implementation of the protocol. If the properties of six-qubit cluster
states under the X-basis are satisfied, Alice prepares them correctly. Otherwise,
Alice is dishonest. And this protocol will terminate.
For the second operation, if the dishonest distributor attempts to make the
recovered shared key wrong, she will be detected by the TDC. Because the TDC
can recover the shared key when the equations (2),(3),(4) and (5) are all satisfied,
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that is, KB , KD, H(B) and H(D) sent by Alice are required to be correct. Thus,
the recovered shared key must be correct.
As a result, the distributor attack could not succeed.
4.2.2 the Participant Attack
In this protocol, the attack strategies that the dishonest participant may
adopt are:
1) The participant steals the secret information in advance during the execution
of the protocol.
2) The participant sends the wrong information, then leads to the recovered
shared key wrong.
For the first attack strategy, as this is a QKA protocol, no one knows the
value of the shared key before the last two participants complete their operations.
So only the last two participants Pi−n−22 and Pi+
n
2
have the opportunities to
take the conspiracy attack. However, S
′
1 and S
′
2 is preserved by Alice, so Pi−n−22
and Pi+n2 cannot recover s in advance.
For the second strategy, the participant Pi (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) has sent the hash
function value H(Ki) with identity to the TDC in the preparation phase. Before
recovering the shared key s, the TDC verifies whether the equations (2) and (3)
hold. If the verification fails, the protocol will be terminated to avoid recovering
the wrong shared key s.
So, the participant attack cannot be successful in this protocol.
5 Comparation Analysis
In this section, we will compare our protocol with three existent MPQKA pro-
tocols.
Ever since the QKA protocol was proposed in 2004, most of QKA protocols
have the problem that only one participant can determine the shared key alone.
Therefore, the fairness can’t be achieved. Next, we compare our protocol with
three MPQKA protocols that can achieve fairness, namely Liu et al.’ s protocol
[22], Xu et al. ’s protocol [23], and Liu and Liang’s protocol [28]. For simplicity,
we call them LG protocol, XW protocol and LL protocol.
For QKA protocol, quantum efficiency [36] is defined as follows:
η =
c
q + b
.
where c is the length of the final recovered shared key, q represents the total
number of bits used in the quantum channel, and the number of bits used in the
classic channel is denoted by b. According to this, the efficiency of our protocol
can be calculated as:
η =
4n
6(n+ l) + 6n
.
where l is the number of particles used to verify Alice’s identity. For convenience,
we make l = n/2. Therefore, the efficiency of our protocol is 26.67%.
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Then as shown in Fig. 2, the existing three MPQKA protocols are compared
with our protocol.
Fig. 2. Comparison between the existent protocols and our protocol
It can be seen from Fig. 2 that the efficiency of our protocol is slightly
increase compared with XW protocol and LG protocol. Besides, our protocol can
resist the participant attacks that LL protocol cannot. Therefore, our protocol
is effective.
6 Summary
Quantum key agreement should satisfy four security features, namely security,
correctness, fairness and privacy. We propose a MPQKA protocol based on six-
qubit cluster states in this paper. A distributor that each operation can be
verified is introduced to resist the internal fraudsters and the external eaves-
droppers attack. And the protocol ensures the correctness and simultaneous of
the shared key by using the homomorphic hash function and the TDC. Besides,
all participants collaborate together to recover the shared key, which guarantee
the fairness and the privacy of the protocol.
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